(Timing was important for a Mideast settlement, say experts) July 27, 2000 Two Middle East experts, Richard Haass, Vice President of the Brookings Institution, and Shibley Telhami, a Brookings Senior Fellow who also holds the Anwar Sadat chair at the University of Maryland, briefed July 26 on the Middle East peace talks held at Camp David, Maryland, from July 11-25. "I think holding the summit was worth doing," Telhami said the day after President Clinton concluded the talks after the negotiators failed to reach an agreement. Telhami noted that if the summit had not taken place, the bridging of positions that took place during the two weeks at Camp David between the Israelis and Palestinians and their leaders, Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, "would have (meant) certain failure to reach an agreement by September." The deadline for a final status agreement is September 13. He also said the serious public debate relating to core issues -- Jerusalem, the most difficult of the issues, borders, refugees and security -- would not have taken place without the summit. The Camp David summit was "the first time the two sides have formally, seriously, comprehensively dealt with the permanent-status issues," Haas said. "And it was quite an extraordinary negotiation in breadth and depth. And, looked at simply in those terms, things will never be the same. And there was substantial progress." He described the U.S. role in the talks as "clearly helpful," but said, "there's always a limit to what mediators or facilitators can do. We can help come up with bridging proposals. Clearly the United States did that. We can essentially argue for each side separately to try to help them think it through, to shape their calculus. But at the end of the day, there's a limit to what the United States can do here." Following is the transcript of the Brookings briefing: (Begin transcript)
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS BRIEFING
BRIEFERS:
TIME: 10:10 A.M., EDT
MR. HAASS: Okay, why don't we get started here this morning? Good morning.
Welcome to Brookings. I'm Richard Haass, vice president and director of foreign
policy studies. And today is essentially the flip side of what Shibley Telhami
and I did some three weeks ago. Then we were looking toward Camp David and
projecting, predicting, assessing what was likely to happen. Now it's our
common task this morning to essentially explain what did happen and why and
where we might go from here. Shibley Telhami, as you know, holds the Anwar Sadat chair at the University of Maryland, and we're fortunate enough here at Brookings to get a piece of his time, because he's also a non-resident senior fellow for us. He is one of this country's true Middle East experts. Originally we were going to try to divide it up, and slightly changing signals on him, where I was going to talk about analysis and he was going to talk about consequences. And then the more we talked last night, and then again this morning, clearly we were both overlapping. So I think you'll get a little bit of analysis and a little bit of likely consequences from both of us. And, based on our conversation this morning, you will not get identical views. Let me start, and then I'll turn to my colleague. And then we will turn to you all for any questions you might have. Like all unsuccessful outcomes, it's possible to do a glass half-full/half-empty analysis here. Let me begin with the glass half-full side, and then I will turn to the glass half-empty side and explain why I come down somewhat more on the latter. Glass half-full. In part, this is the first time the two sides have formally, seriously, comprehensively dealt with the permanent-status issues. As you know, the entire logic of the peace process, of the incremental, gradualist approach that was built into it, was to defer the day when the two sides would actually tackle the so-called core issues. Well, that day arrived, and it was called Camp David II over the last few weeks. And it was quite an extraordinary negotiation in breadth and depth. And, looked at simply in those terms, things will never be the same. And there was substantial progress. And if one were simply to tick down, what you had essentially was Israel willing to accept a Palestinian state, that this Palestinian state would get back roughly 94, 95 percent of the land that Israel had occupied after the 1967 war; a slight transfer of territory from just outside -- right next to the Gaza Strip, that little slice by the Mediterranean, would go back to the Palestinians. But most of the settlements would become part of Israel proper in land that would be annexed, roughly with three-quarters of those Israelis living in settlements. Another 50,000 or so Israelis would be in settlements, which would then be included as part of the Palestinian state, and these people would have the option of staying there. Israeli settlements would, however, be taken down from the Gaza Strip. On refugees, there would be some allowance for refugees, both from pre-'48 as well as '67, to come back. There'd be certain quotas, certain formulas based on family unification and the like for Palestinian refugees to return, but it would not be an unlimited right. It would be a limited allotment or allowance. There would be a large international compensation effort, both to resettle those who did return as well as to directly compensate those who chose not to return. The Israelis would participate financially in that effort, though I believe the bulk of that effort would have had to come from the Arab countries and from Europe. And the Israelis would have given some sort of a statement, a limited statement of sorrow or something along those lines for the predicament of these people. On the security side, the Palestinian state would be a sovereign state, but there would still have been certain limitations on its freedom of action in the area, armaments, militarization, and so forth, in its ability to form alliances. And the Israelis would have had special security allowances or zones and so forth in areas that were part of the Palestinian entity. On Jerusalem, which was ultimately the deal-breaker, as best I can deconstruct it or reconstruct it or understand it, the Israelis put on the table several offers, but the final offer was one that included Palestinian sovereignty of parts of an expanded Jerusalem. The so-called Bernal (ph) outskirts or suburbs would have been incorporated into Jerusalem. Palestinians would have had sovereignty over those areas. The Palestinians would have had extraordinary control over East Jerusalem and over the old city in particular, including certain types of presence; in many ways, many of the features of sovereignty, without the word or legal fact of sovereignty, and control over their holy places. That was the deal that was essentially on the table. Everything was to be accepted if anything was to be accepted. And at the end of the day, Mr. Arafat balked. More than anything else, I think it was over Jerusalem if, in this case, the press reports are correct. And more than anything else, it was over this packaging question. It had less to do, from what I can tell -- and again, I'm reading tea leaves, talking to people from the various delegations -- as best I can tell, are less to do with the specific arrangements and more to do with the packaging of their relations. Words like sovereignty, the appearances, how to deal with the proceedings, had tremendous impact. And this then leads me to my half-empty analysis. There was no deal, obviously, essentially because the Palestinians were unready to compromise. And I would say two things on that. Part of the reason was the absence of support from the Arab world. President Clinton went to considerable lengths at Camp David to try to gin up Arab support for Mr. Arafat and attempted to create a diplomatic environment where he would feel he had greater latitude. From the best I can tell, the Arab government did not respond. And, second of all, Mr. Arafat did himself a disservice if his goal was to go to Camp David and actually get an agreement. There was no way to get an agreement without compromise. And from what I can tell, he did very little to create the space for himself within the Palestinian world that would be tolerant of compromise. To the contrary, he and his lieutenants were regularly articulating fairly ambitious and maximal demands. Clearly that was not going to be on. So they got, if you will, nine-tenths of what it was they had always wanted, but because they had done nothing to prepare their polity for the necessity of compromise in that last tenth, they left themselves no space. Just as an aside, I would say that the reports this morning of the immediate reception for Mr. Arafat, what's being planned for him is not to me reassuring. What he is -- the reports essentially have him being welcomed home as a hero, as a hero who stood firm and who would not give way on any points of principle. I would find it a lot more reassuring if he were welcomed home as the hero who had the courage and the vision to compromise for peace. And this to me says it all, that the politics in the Palestinian areas and in much of the Arab world are still rewarding stands on principle rather than what I would call a willingness to compromise and vision and ultimately statesmanship. Let me talk a little bit about the U.S. role here. The U.S. role was clearly helpful. But, that said, there's always a limit to what mediators or facilitators can do. We can help come up with bridging proposals. Clearly the United States did that. We can essentially argue for each side separately to try to help them think it through, to shape their calculus. But at the end of the day, there's a limit to what the United States can do here. My only criticism of the U.S. side -- and I'm not sure how critical to be -- is not over the decision to convene Camp David. I accept the logic that there wasn't a lot to lose. We were heading toward something of a crisis on September, but on so much of an emphasis on an all-or-nothing deal. Even before Camp David, but if not before, certainly very quickly after it was convened, the limits to what, in particular, the Palestinians were prepared to do was becoming clear. So after, I would think, only several days, the odds of getting a comprehensive package that would allow a fancy signing ceremony on the South Lawn, the odds of that had shrunk, falling dramatically. And at that point, tactically the United States had to decide whether still to push for the ambitious, comprehensive package or whether to begin to change direction and put much more energy behind a partial agreement that essentially would have resolved many of the issues but left Jerusalem outside. And it would have encountered considerable resistance, and indeed did, when they finally did surface this idea. The Israelis were not thrilled with the idea but would have accepted it, preferring that to nothing. And Mr. Arafat clearly resisted this idea, was clearly against the idea of a partial agreement that left Jerusalem outside, was concerned that he would therefore lose his leverage, that if he agreed to everything else but left Jerusalem aside, that the Israelis would essentially have been content with that outcome, and he would have had no means in which to make the status quo untenable for them. So I'm not saying that this would have been easy to call for a partial arrangement, but I think the real tactical question of the American handling at Camp David is whether we did too much to try to get the entire thing solved, even after it became clear that was extremely unlikely and that we should have put more calories, more time and effort behind a partial agreement. Let me go very briefly, because I know Shibley is going to focus on the future, about where we go from here, again to the glass half-empty/glass half-full scenario, a positive and a negative one. The positive one -- and you heard it talked about yesterday by Saeb Eraqat, one of the leading figures on the Palestinian delegation, was that an extraordinary amount was accomplished. This is not the death of this process. This is simply another interregnum. They would now return to the region. They would continue negotiating, and so forth. That's possible. But my problem with that analysis is where are the strengths - - whether you continue in the region, in Camp David, Niagara Falls, wherever, you're only going to get a different outcome if one of two things happen; either the Palestinian side reconsiders its position on a partial agreement or reconsiders its position on Jerusalem. And for any of those to happen, Mr. Arafat would have to do, in the aftermath of Camp David, what he was unwilling to do in the run-up to Camp David, which was to create space for himself in the Arab and Islamic world and in the Palestinian world to compromise. So in the absence of clear evidence that Mr. Arafat is doing after Camp David what I believe he should have done before Camp David, it's not obvious to me how one gets a useful resumption of the process. Also, we don't have unlimited time. I think right now the Middle East is something of a powder keg. There's tremendous frustration on the Palestinian side that they've tried diplomacy; it hasn't worked. There'll be a lot of talk about going back to stones and other things, to the streets. It is a powder keg in the sense also psychologically after what happened here. So you do not simply have September 13th. You have all the distance between July 25th and September 13th, which is a lot of time.
I think also, on the Israeli side, you've got all the parliamentary and extra
-parliamentary maneuvering. And I think, to put it bluntly, Mr. Barak has a
rough situation. Imagine you were on the Israeli right and you stood up and
said the following: "We have just offered the Syrians more than 99 percent of
the post-'67 scenario. Well, that wasn't good enough for them. We've offered
Lebanon 100 percent of what they want, and that's not good enough for them. And
we've just offered the Palestinians an extraordinary agreement," including more
than 95 percent of the territory and all the other arrangements I discussed
before about Jerusalem, refugees and the rest, "and that's not good enough for
them. Where is the partner in the Arab world?" So you have people on the
Israeli right who would essentially say, "I think Barak" -- they would say,
"Barak went too far, and even going too far, didn't get dividends." So what you have right now is, on the Palestinian side, I think, great frustration, and on the Israeli side, great questioning of the potential for a peace process. And that, to me, is extremely worrying. And the trilateral statement that the sides issued at the end of Camp David, there were certain principles that they commit themselves to further process. And one thing they said, and I'll quote here, is that the two sides understand the importance of avoiding unilateral action. And that to me is an interesting wording, because it doesn't say the two sides commit themselves to refrain from unilateral action. And so as we move beyond Camp David, what concerns me is simply the incident that sparks, the politics on the Israeli side, and as we move toward September 13th, the potential for unilateral actions by the Palestinians, which I think would then trigger unilateral actions in response by the Israelis. So if I were to say to watch one thing, to basically see how we avoid a negative consequence for Camp David, is to watch the politics on the Palestinian side and to essentially watch what the lessons are there, what the debate is there, and whether Mr. Arafat and his lieutenants begin to carve out space for themselves so they could return to the negotiations and conceivably agree to something like what they rejected. If you begin to see that, then I think there's room for optimism. However, if we do not see Palestinian diplomacy take a turn in that direction and instead we only see Mr. Arafat and company standing firm, rewarded for being heroes who didn't compromise, then I think essentially it's "Katie, bar the door" and we're going to look back on this as a serious lost opportunity. Shibley.
MR. TELHAMI: As usual, there will be a lot that I will agree with with Richard,
but there will be also some disagreements. So I don't think you'll be bored by
two identical presentations. First, let me begin about the failure of the summit. I just think -- I do agree with Richard. I think, first, we have to look at the glass half-full story. I think holding the summit was worth doing. If the summit was not held, you would not have had the bridging of the positions that have taken place and you would have had certain failure to reach an agreement by September anyway. And so I think, you know, making the effort is certainly worth it. I think the second issue is that we did have, as a consequence, serious public debate related to core issues that would not have taken place otherwise, which clearly also helps in ultimately reaching an agreement. The third; I think even the timing of the question early on was "Do we hold the summit early July or do we hold it closer to the deadline?" which is September 13th. It's clear that now the decision to hold it earlier was the wiser decision, because had this failure taken place closer to the deadline, there would be no time to regroup. And right now there is still some opportunity to regroup, because it is in everybody's interest still to reach an agreement. So in that sense, all of these issues, actually, were positive. I think the puzzle to me, as an analyst, as somebody who followed this as a student of Middle East politics, was that the ultimate failure was on the issue of Jerusalem. And clearly there was an assumption, I think, that somehow, if Arafat is offered a state in most of the West Bank and Gaza, with Israeli concessions on a number of issues, he will ultimately compromise on the question of sovereignty over East Jerusalem, especially the old city. That clearly was an operating assumption, and I would argue that all of the so -called scenarios that Richard talked about that were offered were shades of this particular assumption. They were not different. And I think that that was an erroneous assumption. I think anybody who viewed what Arafat was facing, how he looked at his calculations in the Palestinian community, and also in the Arab and Muslim world, knew that he really could not have gone home with Israeli sovereignty on the old city. It just was not an option. That was also known about Barak. Barak could not have done it. I think, therefore, the logical assumption was to go to say, "There's not going to be a possibility of a final agreement on the question of sovereignty over the old city." I would start with that as an operating assumption. I would build my entire strategy in that conference to lead to that and perhaps lead to some postponement on it. I don't think there is a question -- in my mind as an analyst, I don't think there's any doubt that they would reach this settlement. I don't think it's strictly a question of what Arafat could have done or Barak could have done. I think they had to read their contacts, and I personally don't think Arafat could have signed an agreement either in his own community or in the Arab world right now that granted Israel sovereignty over the whole city. And I know that Barak could not have sold an agreement to his public granting Palestinian sovereignty over the old city. So Arafat, I think, was a little -- it's not clear to many why this is so important to him, not just in a Palestinian context, which it's highly rejected in the Palestinian context as a symbolic issue. But on the Arab and Muslim side, there is something a little bit even beyond the issue of importance, you know, religiously. I think for the Palestinians, for a long time, pan-Arabism, when it was in its hey-day, when it was the core, strong movement, popular movement in the Arab world, championed the Palestinians were essentially the Arab cause. Well, that Arabism is no more, really. I mean, they don't have that support. Then the Palestinians were left with a lot of good will in the region from a number of episodes historically, and a lot of that good will really disappeared after the Gulf War. And the Palestinians, in fact, lost a lot of support, frankly, among the Arab states, although there remained to be a lot of support, but it was a shadow of itself. And I think the question of Jerusalem is, in a way, the core link between the Palestinians and their support in the Arab and Islamic world. If Arafat had given that as a card away, I think it would be very, very, very difficult for him to face those relations now in the Muslim world. So I think that, you know, he's facing an extraordinary context here, and I think he might have been reading his red lines correctly. It's not a question of could he compromise or not. He needs to be able to reach an agreement that he can sell. You don't want it to fall apart. And he can't be Sadat, because he is too weak to be Sadat. Egypt could stand on its own for a decade of isolation. If the Saudis had rejected this agreement, the Egyptians had rejected this agreement, I don't think this agreement could have survived; no question in my mind about that. So to me, it's a puzzle that this was not known; this was not the core assumption of going into this negotiation. There was too much optimism about the ability to finalize this issue. And remember, this is not an incremental agreement. We were not -- as Richard said, it was an all-or-nothing. It was a final agreement. It was to be a final agreement. So, therefore, if you read Arafat's behavior historically in negotiations, he's willing to take a little, like David Ben-Gurion. Whatever you are giving, he will take, as long as it's not a final deal. In the context of a final deal, there is a different calculation about holding firm. So in Oslo he would compromise. If this was portrayed as an interim agreement, one can envision his compromise on Jerusalem. But as a formal deal at this time, I just don't see how he could have done it. So that's an area where we certainly disagree on the issue. Let me move to the blame game in the U.S. I think that -- I don't think it's really healthy for us in the U.S. now to start placing blame, for a number of reasons. First of all, I think it's very important to acknowledge the courage that was displayed in the summit. I think that Barak has been very courageous, not only politically but personally. He took personal risks, and he did go farther than any Israeli leader has ever done. I think that he goes back to a very uncertain political future, and I think that has to be acknowledged and has to be admired, even without an agreement. And I think that's a good thing to do in the political process. I think it's also important to understand that Arafat did make very important compromises and on very important issues. I think if you look at at least the outlines of what we have heard, he was willing to compromise in a significant way on a highly emotional issue to the Palestinians, one that he's undoubtedly going to face trouble over, and that is the refugee question, which obviously is a red line for Israel. The fact that any agreement that is going to come out of this or was supposed to be going to come out of this was going to, in essence, you know, have Arafat's agreement that most refugees will not go back to Israel, which obviously is an Israeli demand, that's an emotional issue. He faces political risks with that issue. The second issue on which he clearly compromised is settlement, a highly emotional issue for the past, really, 30 years. And ultimately, the proposed solution that he appeared to acquiesce in is of annexing most of the settlers into Israel. And even the ones that are not annexed, most of them would have the right to stay, although ultimately under Palestinian sovereignty. So that's a highly emotional issue. And so it's not correct to say that he was not flexible. I think those are huge compromises. And it's very impressive, actually, for both of them to have reached what appears to be almost agreement on all those other issues. Clearly Jerusalem was the obstacle. I think, to the extent now, that we face the following. There is still a window of opportunity. That window of opportunity is based on the fact that the major issues have been narrowed significantly. The red lines are well-known. Public debates are now going on; and that it is in the interest of all of them, the Israelis, the Palestinians, and certainly American interests, to have an agreement or not, because if not, we're either going to have things go out of control with violence or there'll be a declaration of a Palestinian state unilaterally, which also could lead to violence. So we really -- it's still in the interest of everybody to have an agreement, and there's still a window because September 13th is still weeks away. I think it's very important not to enter into a political process that will ultimately reduce the chance of that agreement, of starting blame. And I'm worried a little bit personally about this becoming now an issue in the political campaigns here. Let me tell you why; not so much, I think, that it might, in essence, generate a sentiment that would be resented in the region and might be counterproductive, but I also think that although September 13 is the deadline, Arafat has left himself a very important loophole. He got his central committee, before he came to Camp David, to essentially give him the right to declare a state any time between September 13 and the end of the year. And really, September 13 is a deadline, but the opening is really from September 13 till December 31st. It was conventional wisdom among people who watched this that he's not likely to declare a state, even without an agreement, before the American elections. He certainly doesn't want to enter into a contentious relationship with the U.S. and make this an election issue. And if he does, he's going to be a loser. And I think that, you know, this is something that he had to take into account. If this becomes an issue now early on and he comes under a lot of pressure at home from his militants to do something, it might accelerate his timetable for declaring a state, which is not a good thing. And so I do think that now is the time to cool it. And actually, what happens is interesting. I think that both sides have been very restrained in the degree to which they're blaming the other. I think they started off a little bit early on, you know, with some blame of the other. It's inevitable. But ultimately, they've been extremely restrained, and I think that's a good thing. And I think we ought to be restrained here on that issue. Let me turn back just quickly to the consequences for Arafat at home and for Barak at home. I think Richard is right. Arafat right now, in the short term, has a lot to gain. He does look like a hero who held firm. And I think, oddly enough, he mobilizes now more Arab and Muslim support than he's been able to do in more than a decade. I think that by virtue of focusing on the question of Jerusalem and holding firm on that issue specifically, he now suddenly gets more support for the Palestinian cause in the Arab and Muslim world than he has had since the Gulf War. So in some ways he's strengthened. On the other hand, I don't know how long that could last, because now he's being taunted. He's being taunted by his militants. "You've tried negotiations. We told you they wouldn't work. Look at Hezbollah. Give us five years." They were already announcing that yesterday. "You know, give us five years of militancy." He obviously can't do that. It might push him to accelerate his timetable on September 13. But personally, I think he can hold it together. I think he can go back and maintain his domestic support for another round of negotiations if another one becomes necessary. So actually, he's not significantly weakened. In some ways he's strengthened. He can hold off the opposition. But there is a wild card, and the wild card is if Hamas succeeds in carrying out any violence, which obviously would generate a cycle that no one can control. But I think, on the whole, he's in better control of his domestic situation now than Barak. Let me turn to Barak quickly. I think Barak goes back with a mixed bag. I think in some ways the peace movement is going to praise him for trying hard and respect him for it, and the right wing is going to praise him for holding firm. So in a way he's not -- at the popular level he is not doing too badly. His problem is really in the coalition government, and there I think he faces obviously a problem. He has to put a government together and he faces the possibility of the national unity government with Likud. And if he does that it is going to tie his hands in making any move, even along the lines that he made already at Camp David. So I don't think that's a real possibility for him if he envisions that he is going to have another shot at a round or a negotiation. The harder it is to enter into a coalition -- now a coalition, particularly with Shas, which remains a possibility now that he didn't have an agreement -- and I think he can -- that's an option that is really available for him. It can buy him time for a few weeks. And he has another good thing happening which is that the Israeli parliament, it goes on vacation August 6th until October 29th. And so in a way he faces a no -confidence move on Monday; he is likely to survive that now that he doesn't have an agreement, and then he can buy himself the time with the Israeli Knesset going on vacation, which would suit the Palestinian timetable very well. So I think in a way they are going to have another shot if they don't have the wildcard of violence. And the wildcard of violence is there. I think Richard is absolutely right: I think that's something none of them can control, and that is something that can get out of hand. In the end, I think all sides know that an agreement is in their interests and it's their best option. The real question ultimately will be whether this particular failure or the perception of failure in this set of negotiations allows their opposition to tie their hands from trying again. Thank you.
MR. HAASS: Thank you, Shibley. With that we will open it up to you all. I
will ask you to wait for a microphone, let us know who you are, and to keep it
succinct. Yes, sir?
Q: My name is Jeff Philips (ph). I work here for the BBC World Service. I
would like to ask two questions, the first one to Shibley Telhami about the
space that was available to Mr. Arafat, and whether he could have worked harder
with the Palestinian community to try to make himself more space, to use Dr.
Haass' phrase. My feeling is that the Palestinian community, particularly that
living in the West Bank in the occupied territories and in Gaza, is much more
willing to make compromises with the Israelis than perhaps the leadership is,
and particularly the leadership that has come back from Tunis. That's my first
point. And secondly to ask whether this summit at Camp David, Dr. Haass, might not be a very high point of American involvement in the process. Maybe a new administration might want to put it on the back burner for a bit.
MR. TELHAMI: Well, let me begin with the first question. I think you're right
that there's a lot more flexibility in public opinion. Public opinion has been
extremely supportive of the peace process, even when Assad was not seen to be
doing very well. But on the question of Jerusalem, public opinion has been very
clear: the people -- there were polls conducted asking the Palestinians, What
if you have the full state and all of the West Bank and Gaza, but without
Jerusalem versus the status quo? -- and there was a clear rejection of over 80
percent of the public on this question. There were polls that were conducted on
the West Bank and Gaza. There was a strong sentiment for it -- it's a symbolic
issue. I do think that it boils down really to practical questions, and I think what Richard said earlier, it came down to packaging. I don't think that there's a major difference between them on the issue of functional arrangements. I think they can agree to functional arrangements -- they've worked that out. I think that's where the public is very permissive I think. They -- you know, there is de facto separation in Jerusalem already. People know they can figure out what functions each side should have. But the bottom line is over the symbolism of sovereignty. Why is that important? Not only because it's really ultimate ownership of land and ultimate legal power, but because of the perception. Perceptions matter here. Arafat cannot be perceived to have pulled out on Jerusalem, and Barak cannot be perceived to have pulled out on Jerusalem. That's really the problem: is how do you package it in a way where each one of them appears to be a winner? And I really don't see a formula right now. That's why I was arguing for postponement. I just don't see it. Maybe there is one, but I don't see it at this point.
MR. HAASS: Let me tackle your second question. It's six months roughly from
now that a new administration takes office. It's possible that -- but I would -
- probably not the most likely outcome that we are exactly where we are today in
six months. That would mean no moving ahead -- it's possible. But ultimately
no moving backwards. And that would mean that somehow we got through the
potential for crisis that exists today. It seems to me somehow get through
September 13th, get through December 31st without unilateral action on either
side, the political leadership on both sides remains pretty much the same. I
just find that hard to believe. If things get better because people come back from Camp David, reflect, they start doing some of the things I talked about in the Arab world, in the Palestinian camp and so forth. Barak's hands are not tied. They in a sense revive. It becomes Camp David 2A. Then the new administration inherits the success story. Mr. Clinton could still perhaps finish up on his watch. I think that's the most optimistic, but not perhaps the most likely scenario. More likely is that there are problems, in which case it's unlikely that a new administration would have the luxury of putting this on the back burner. If there's terrible events going on between Israel and the Palestinians, that will create a sense of urgency. If that is going on, it will clearly affect for the worse U.S. position, U.S. relations in the Arab world. Again, that will make it difficult to put this on the back burner. I think the real question though is if the U.S. is to get involved again, at what level? It seems to me one of the lessons of the last two weeks is you only do something ambitious or grand a la Camp David III if things are wired. And what you don't want to have is a repeat of this, where you bring everyone together in the hope that somehow you are going to be able to resolve everything. I think the next -- I mean, this president went to Geneva -- it didn't work -- with Assad. And now he's gone to Camp David -- and it didn't work -- with the Israelis and the Palestinians. I would just think that it would be very hard to advise the new president to, say, bring parties together in the hopes it is going to work out. I think you only do that if it's wired.
The alternative is you go back to something more modest, and you look at partial
agreements, and you look at ways of making the day to day work again. And to me
t he real question is: How much damage is done? What kind of pieces are you
picking up? But I would only get ambitious, again -- indeed, I think the logic
of Shibley's argument is you never even should have gotten ambitious now, given
the gap between the parties. You have got to size your diplomacy to fit the
opportunity, and it is a legitimate criticism to make that this diplomacy was
sized too large. And that's just -- I mean, you can take my analysis that
Arafat hadn't done all he could and should have done to create space for himself,
but that is a fact of life two weeks ago. Knowing that, did it make sense for
the United States to go for an all-or-nothing approach, or should we have
crafted and focused almost from the get-go on something more modest that
reflected the political realities? That's a legitimate question.
Q: I am Paul Taylor, diplomatic editor of Reuters. I have been here to cover
the talks.
MR. HAASS: -- the British emphasis --
Q: Thank you very much for allowing us Brits to share so much expertise in such
a short time. [Off-mike comment from audience.]
Q: I just want to question, particularly Dr. Haass, about what you said about
really the only two sort of ways to move forward would be a partial agreement or
a Palestinian reconsidering of that position on Jerusalem. You seem to exclude
without discussing it the possibility that the Israelis might move further. Now, it's true that Barak went a long way, and clearly went further from his base line than Arafat did. On the other hand, the Israeli consensus also seems to have moved further from its base line than the Palestinian one has during the course of this process. That may be partly better preparation. But I think it's also to a degree a realization in Israeli public opinion that you know in reality they have already given East Jerusalem back, they don't go there, they avoid driving through it -- it is alien to them. And therefore isn't there a possibility in fact that the Israelis might be able to go a little bit further perhaps, giving more of East Jerusalem outside the Old City to Palestinian sovereignty, and then that would then leave the Old City where perhaps some kind of notional -- non-foreign presence, but some notional international custodianship or something might be able to bridge or else overlapping sovereignties or one of these other things that diplomats are paid to invent?
MR. HAASS: The trite answer is anything is possible. But I would just put this
in the "extremely unlikely" box. One is Barak already has come a lot further
than what people thought the limits of Israeli information tolerance was.
Second of all, his political situation at the moment is not one that would
normally lend itself to greater flexibility on his part. Thirdly, the
Palestinians didn't give any indications that what was missing was just a little
bit more, and only then would they be prepared to buy. We weren't talking about
a few blocks in Jerusalem. It seems to me that the Palestinian position as best
I understand it was reverting to what you might call first principle, and the
idea that the Israelis would be able to entertain some of the ideas that you
just suggested or the polls recently suggested and all that I would say is a
nonstarter. Sir.
Q: Steffen Vanvish (ph), the Dutch Embassy. Both of you stressed very much
that it is a package problem, but the impression that we got at EU from the
Palestinian side is that in fact the package was not the real problem, but only
one element in the package, and that's Jerusalem of course, that you have to get
more into details. In the end it seems to be only the Haram Sharif, Mount
Temple that is the real problem. On all the other things there seems to be
enough in this package to get to a deal. If it came to sovereignty over there,
what the Israelis claim in spite of the international custodianship of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and Morocco, and there the Israelis
claim the final sovereignty in spite of all kinds of other de facto
arrangements. Well, as has been mentioned, that problem seems to be gigantic,
because for both sides of course the Haram Sharif is so holy and has such
religious symbolism that no -- as Mr. Haass just repeated, no solution seems to
be possible. You c
MR. HAASS: Is there a question in this?
Q: Well, should it be more focused only on this part, because the impression we
got is in the end this is the sticking point?
MR. TELHAMI: Well, by packaging it's not a question of linking issues but
rather what do you -- how do you sell this agreement? Who has -- ultimately who
has sovereignty? Of all the solutions, the functional questions about who
controls what neighborhoods they didn't have a problem on, as far as I could
tell. Obviously we're all, you know, basing it on conversations and reports.
But to my knowledge, Israel never put on the table a proposal where the
Palestinians would be sovereign over other parts of the Old City other than
Haram Sharif. And so -- and the Old City is the core. I mean, that is the core
question. I mean it's the holy places plus the entire -- the entire Old City.
You know, ultimately who is sovereign over that? The international -- you know, the internationalization options have not been on the horizon in the Israeli political map for a number of reasons. One is, you know, political suspicion of any international authority, especially the U.N., that one can argue historic and psychological, and I am not sure down the road whether there would be an openness to that or not. The overlapping sovereignty issue, or the joint sovereignty issue -- I am not sure there is a precedence for that. I mean, you know, you have to have a model. You can call it whatever you want, but the bottom line is who is going to be the ultimate owner of land, who is going to be the ultimate legal power. And it's very hard to imagine a situation of an international system today as we know it where you have joint sovereignty. And so that, you know, that becomes a real problem in contemplating options.
Q: Karem Hagard (ph) from the Egyptian Embassy. This question is for Dr.
Telhami. I was wondering if you could elaborate on your assessment of how this
could be an issue in the campaign. What in your view are the parameters of the
debate likely to be? Is it going to be pressure on Israel, failed foreign
policy? I think that's a crucial point.
MR. TELHAMI: Pressure on Israel is not on the horizon from anyone in the
American political system, especially now that Barak is perceived to have done a
lot of compromises, and Arafat is perceived to be the one who has not. I think
what could happen, especially if let's say Arafat in the next few weeks declares
a Palestinian state unilaterally, and that leads into contentious relations
between Arafat and Israel, the political candidates will be competing to target
him. The relationship between the U.S. and the Palestinians will worsen
dramatically in the political campaign. So clearly he wants to keep that out of
it. I think that you know that is a calculation he cannot ignore, because he
might be able to live with no dramatic American support for his declaration of
independence, but I don't think he can live with dramatic opposition by the
United States to his declaration of independence. And so he has to take that
into his calculation. And that's why I think that, you know, if this becomes an
issue
MR. HAASS: I think it's safe to bet the United States would strongly oppose any
unilateral declaration of independence. We wouldn't recognize the Palestinian
entity at that point. I also think on the Hill, if I had to predict, it would create an environment where the United States would stop giving aid to the Palestinians. I just think it would create a very confrontational relationship. Sir?
Q: Yeah, David Sands at the Washington Times. I wonder if you think it's a
fair criticism of the administration that they didn't do enough ground work with
the rest of the Arab world, with our influence with, say, Egypt and Saudi Arabia
before the summit to give Mr. Arafat some space. I know the president called
some leaders during the summit -- and if you think it might be a fruitful place
for the U.S. to create some space moving ahead.
MR. HAASS: You want to take that or should I?
MR. TELHAMI: Well, yeah. I mean, you know, I have -- I know based on
conversations I had with a lot of the administration people is this was on their
mind even before the summit. The real question is whether they have done enough
preparation, particularly on the question of Jerusalem. Obviously I don't think
people understood -- you know, based on what I have seen happen, understood the
importance of this particular issue and Arafat's calculation pertaining to the
rest of the Arab and Muslim world. I don't know whether a statement like from -- a unified statement from a number of Arab leaders would have been helpful if they said, for example, we'll agree to anything that Arafat comes home with. Some Arab states I know gave that assurance to the U.S. before hand. Some were not able to give that to them, because they were sort of needing to know what the details of the agreement are. And I think that ultimately even those who had given assurances may have had to reassess if the outcome was not on this issue something they can live with. And I give you an example of what transpired during the first Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel. Jimmy Carter sat secretly with then Crown-Prince Fahd before the Camp David accords. Jimmy Carter understood the conversation to mean that the Saudis will support what comes out at Camp David, and he understood it that way, he planned it that way, and Camp David came out, the Saudis assessed the terms, looked at the reaction in the Arab world, decided they can't support it. And you know that's something you can't -- you -- so you have -- you basically have to take a lead as well as take assurances. You have to take a lead about how this plays. Perhaps not enough was done on it.
MR. HAASS: I would have said yes we could have done more. I'm not sure what
results we would have gotten, David. To me the bigger question again is the
tactics about whether we did as much as we might have done for a partial
agreement. Again, I think it was -- if it wasn't predictable before Camp David
was convened, it became readily apparent soon thereafter that the odds of
getting a comprehensive package were modest. And so the question is: At one
point do you surface fallbacks or plan Bs, and how far do you push them? And
maybe it's Monday morning quarterbacking, but as soon as you do surface a plan B
or a fallback you clearly reduce the urgency around your comprehensive approach.
But again, given the difficult of these issues, given the lack of evidence that
Arafat had created any space for himself and the Palestinian community, given
the lack of clear support from the Arab and Islamic world, I would have thought
that it made sense to get more modest earlier on rather than essentially do it
towar Yes, ma'am?
Q: Hi, Claire Court (ph), Department of State. Fast forward to September 13th.
Say nothing has happened between now and then. What would it take to get
Arafat not unilaterally declare a state? Because he already tried to do it once
and then was put off. Would that weaken him? Would that weaken his position
if he did it again? And say that he did actually declare a state -- what would
the Israeli response be?
MR. HAASS: Well, on the Israeli response side, besides non-recognition,
needless to say, I think you would have some unilateral actions in kind. I can
imagine some annexations of territory, interestingly enough, possibly in keeping
with some of the things that we discussed at Camp David.
MR. TELHAMI: Right.
MR. HAASS: I would think that there would be some unilateral actions that
Israel would take which would very much borrow what would have been put in place
had there been an agreement at Camp David. An interesting question. Depending
upon whether there was violence or not, I think you would have curfews, you
would have some closures and so forth. I think you would have very much that
kind of a confrontational or stand-off atmosphere. I think the goal would be to
have -- on the Israeli part -- to try to avoid declaration of independence,
leading either to violence or to a wide number of recognitions. I think the
Israelis would clearly be working diplomatically in Europe and elsewhere to try
to discourage host governments from recognizing the Palestinian entity. And I
do think though they would -- any Israeli government would be compelled to take
unilateral action in response. But my prediction would be that they would be
very much in keeping with what was set forth at Camp David.
MR. TELHAMI: On the first part, assuming that there was no violence --
obviously that's always a wild card -- assuming that there is no violence, and
assuming that a peace process continues -- that is, there are continued
negotiations in the prospect of further talks -- assuming that there is no
significant worsening in American-Palestinian relations as a consequence of this
failures, along the lines that I discussed, I think there is a reasonable chance
that it could be push beyond September 13. I think his deadline -- as I said,
his real deadline is December. September might be accelerated as a consequence
of events. If things are deteriorating and his militant opposition is prompting
him, then he may be pushed to accelerate that. But I always believe that the
likely date in reality might be more like after the election. So there is a little bit more of a window, as long as there is a process in place where things are progressing rather than going backwards.
MR. HAASS: But just to sort of highlight one thing which I think we both agree
on, the idea that you could pull off some kind of reciprocal set of unilateral
actions in a way that didn't spark violence -- I think the odds of that are
small.
MR. TELHAMI: Definitely.
MR. HAASS: I think you have got to predict or assume, at least heavily factor
into your analysis, that if the Palestinians take unilateral actions the Israeli
government will -- but so also will actors on both sides who are outside the
control of the government and the local authorities. You have almost got to
assume that it would get messy at that point. And the real question is: How
messy with what consequences? It's very hard to see how that goes off some kind
of a new choreography. We've probably got time for about one more. If I don't see any hands, at exactly -- oh, okay. Yes.
Q: Just to leave the answer you gave to my question to the one you've just now
given to the last questioner, might there not be an American -- a case for an
American masterly indifference to what's going for a while? I mean if there
were a bit of violence, and if there were a bit of bloodshed, I mean, might it
not be quite useful to say to the parties, "You can't always depend upon
outsiders to extricate you from these problems?," and that in itself would put
pressure on them to come to some other political arrangements, one would hope.
MR. HAASS: That's a tactic. It's a little bit like you sometimes think things
have to get worse before they get a little bit better, and you're hoping for
that. I have two rules about the Middle East, and I'll share one of them with
you today, which is in the Middle East things have to get worse before they get
even worse. The idea that somehow you would have just the right amount of
violence to bring people to some sober conclusion, and then they were ready to
become forthcoming is too clever by half. There're just too many players there,
there're too many forces. So I am uneasy once we begin to go down that path.
That said, I think for the United States we won't be able to control the
situation.
Again, there'll be no stomach or incentive for doing something grand or
ambitious unless we have reason to believe this time it will work. So the real
question then is: We're back into the vineyards of step-by-step, something more
modest, to try to keep the lid on or to try to move -- because you can't get
everything resolved, going back to the old bicycle theory how you once again
restore a sense of forward movement. And I think that then becomes the focal
point of American diplomacy. It's not stew in your juices -- that's too
dangerous, your scenario. It's not Camp David III now at the moment. The real
question is: What can the United States usefully do between those two options?
And my hunch is pretty soon that's where we are going to be focus on. Any final word?
MR. TELHAMI: I agree with that.
MR. HAASS: Well, on a rare note -- actually not a rare note. On our typical
note of agreement, we will conclude. And thank you very much for coming to
Brookings this morning. And thank you to my colleague Shibley Telhami. [APPLAUSE AND END OF EVENT.] (End transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. )
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